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Shareholders dissatisfied with the corporation’s decision to merge 
or consolidate may seek redress by asking a court to assign a fair value to 
their shares. The right to an appraisal is longstanding and “entirely a 
creature of statute.”2 Exercising the right, however, entails certain risks. 
Under Delaware law, the process is uncertain and can result in a value 
less than what was offered in the merger.3 In addition, the process may 
take years to complete, with shareholders remaining unpaid until comple-
tion of the judicial valuation process. 
Shareholders, therefore, must make a difficult calculation in deter-
mining whether to exercise appraisal rights. Nonetheless, reports have 
suggested that hedge funds and other professional investors have targeted 
appraisal rights as a method of enhancing their return.4 These investors at 
least sometimes make tactical purchases of stock in target companies in 
order to obtain these rights.5 Some even wait until after the record date 
but before the shareholder vote to buy the shares subject to appraisal 
rights.6 
Shareholders exercising appraisal rights, including speculative in-
vestors, presumably do so because they believe that the process will re-
  
  * J.D. and Corporate and Commercial Law Certificate Candidate, May 2015. 
 2. Kaye v. Pantone, Inc., 395 A.2d 369, 374 (Del. Ch. 1978). 
 3. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Fine Legal Point Poses Challenge to Appraisal Rights, 
DEALBOOK, NEW YORK TIMES (May 30, 2014, 2:59 PM) (discussing how Merion Capital, a hedge 
fund, “is exercising appraisal rights as a business strategy.”). See also LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, 
Appraisal Arbitrage: When Will it Become a New Hedge Fund Strategy?, M&A DEAL 
COMMENTARY, 1–2 (May 2007),  (suggesting that the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in In 
re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. created a “new ‘market’ in appraisal rights” by holding 
that investors who purchase shares in the target company after the record date “may assert appraisal 
rights so long as the aggregate number of shares for which appraisal is being sought is less than the 
aggregate number of shares that either voted no on the merger or didn’t vote on the merger.”), avail-
able at   http://www.lw.com/upload/pubcontent/_pdf/pub1883_1.pdf. See also In re Appraisal of 
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1554–CC, 2007 WL 1378345 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). 
 5. The Growth of Appraisal Litigation in Delaware, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati 
(Nov. 18, 2013), 
https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-
delaware-appraisal-litigation.htm. Investors are able to do so because of the Court of Chancery’s 
decision in Transkaryotic, wherein the court discussed the availability of the remedy for beneficial 
holders of shares acquired after the record date. See generally Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 
1378345. 
 6. See Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345. See generally George S. Geis, An Ap-
praisal Puzzle, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1635 (2011) (discussing the effects of Transkaryotic’s holding 
on appraisal proceedings). 
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sult in a more favorable valuation.7 Empirically, they appear to be cor-
rect. An examination of reported appraisal cases over the last five years 
indicates that fair value generally exceeds the merger price, sometimes 
by a considerable amount.8 Even where shareholders receive only a mod-
est improvement over the merger price, they benefit through a highly 
favorable interest rate mandated by statute.9 
Part I of this paper provides an overview of appraisal rights. It in-
cludes a discussion of appraisal-triggering events, the applicable process, 
the consequences of exercising appraisal rights, and the methodologies 
developed by the courts to value the shares. Part II.A discusses the actual 
results of judicial valuations of shares in cases resolved over the last five 
years, and examines the rationale the court supplies in making this de-
termination. Finally, Part II.B proposes that the subjective nature of the 
court’s determination of fair value of the dissenting shareholders’ shares 
actually benefits shareholders in Delaware. 
I. OVERVIEW OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS  
Appraisal rights are a statutory remedy available to minority share-
holders of a corporation who object to the price paid for their shares in a 
merger or consolidation.10 The remedy enables dissenting shareholders to 
require the acquirer to repurchase their stock at a price equivalent to “the 
fair or intrinsic value of the corporation's stock immediately before the 
merger.”11 The statute assigns to the courts the final authority to deter-
mine “fair value.”12   
These rights arose out of the common law requirement that prohib-
ited a corporation from making a “fundamental organic change” without 
unanimous shareholder approval.13 An inflexible approach, states even-
tually abrogated from this authority and provided appraisal rights as an 
alternative.14 First appearing in the 1920s,15 appraisal statutes were only 
put to common use in the 1960s.16 
  
 7. See supra note 4. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251–567 (2013). 
 S. ection 1.01 
11
 Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 192 n.22 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 12. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2013). 
 13. Valuation of Dissenters’ Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1453, 1453 
(1966). See also Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts 
Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 618–19 (1998) (“Prior to the enactment of [appraisal] 
statutes, the general rule in most states was that a corporation could not merge or consolidate with 
another corporation without the unanimous consent of its shareholders.”). 
 14. Wertheimer, supra note 13, at 618. 
 15. See Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 91 (1995) (discussing the history of appraisal rights). By 1927, approximate-
ly twenty states had them in place. Id. 
 16. See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corpo-
rate Law, 84 GEO. L. J. 1, 14–25 (1995) (discussing the so-called “renaissance of appraisal rights” in 
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The process of exercising appraisal rights generally involves three 
distinct steps: a triggering event;17 notice and exercise;18 and judicial 
valuation of the shares.19 Statutes differ in a number of fundamental 
ways, most commonly with respect to the triggering events and the tim-
ing of the payment to dissenting shareholders.20 
A. Triggering Events in Delaware 
Under Delaware law,21 appraisal rights are automatically triggered 
by some22 but not all mergers.23 The market-out exception eliminates 
appraisal rights in mergers with companies that are widely traded.24 That 
exception, in turn, does not apply where the consideration is paid in 
cash.25 Delaware also allows for private ordering with respect to apprais-
al rights. A corporation may, through its certificate of incorporation, pro-
  
the 1960s). Thompson asserts that the renaissance resulted from shareholders’ infrequent use of the 
remedy, in response to which states implemented important changes in the process. Id. 
 17. See infra Part I.B. 
 18. See infra Part I.C. 
 19. See infra Part I.D. 
 20. Harvard Law Review Association, Valuation of Dissenters’ Stock Under Appraisal Stat-
utes, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1453, 1453 (1966). 
 21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2013). The statute mandates that, subject to certain 
exceptions, “[a]ppraisal rights shall be available for the shares of any class or series of stock of a 
constituent corporation in a merger or consolidation.” Id. See also id. at §§ 251–54, 257–58, 263–64. 
A corporation may also voluntarily provide appraisal rights for changes to any class or series of 
shares if set out in the certificate of incorporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c) (2013). Only 
a few jurisdictions follow Delaware’s model in recognizing mergers as the “sole statutorily-required 
appraisal trigger.” Mary Siegel, An Appraisal of the Model Business Corporation Act’s Appraisal 
Rights Provisions, 74–WTR LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 234 (2011) (as of the date of the article, 
only two jurisdictions followed Delaware’s approach). The MBCA approach provides more oppor-
tunity for shareholders to seek appraisal rights than the Delaware statute. See MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 13.02(a)(1)–(8) (2002) (shareholders entitled to appraisal rights in the event of a(n): (1) mer-
ger; (2) share exchange; (3) disposition of assets; (4) amendment of the articles of incorporation; (5) 
domestication; and (6) conversion). Ninety-six percent of jurisdictions follow the MBCA’s ap-
proach. Siegel, supra, at 235. 
 22. It also exempts the remedy for “any shares of stock of the constituent corporation surviv-
ing a merger if the merger did not require for its approval the vote of the stockholders of the surviv-
ing corporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (2013). 
 23. See id. at §§ 251–52, 254–58, 263–64. The types of mergers that trigger appraisal rights 
include, among others, certain mergers of domestic or foreign corporations, merger of domestic 
corporation and joint-stock or other association, merger of domestic nonstock corporations, and 
merger of domestic corporations and partnerships. 
 24. Id. at § 262(b)(1) (appraisal rights do not apply to the shares of any corporation listed on a 
national securities exchange or held by more than 2,000 record holders). See also R. FRANKLIN 
BALOTTI AND JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, § 9.43 The Availability of Statutory Appraisal Rights, in 1 
BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN’S DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 
(2014). Other exceptions include: fractional depository receipts or cash in lieu of fractional shares 
described in the shares of stock or deposit receipts exception; or any combination of the shares of 
stock, depository receipts and cash in lieu of fractional shares or fractional depository receipts de-
scribed in foregoing sections. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (2013). 
 25. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (2013). Specifically, the provision “provides 
appraisal rights in any merger where the holders of shares receive cash or securities other than stock 
of a widely held corporation, stock of the surviving corporation, or a mix of the two.” BALOTTI & 
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 24. 
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vide for appraisal rights “for the shares of any class or series of its 
stock.”26   
B. The Appraisal Process in Delaware  
Shareholders seeking to assert appraisal rights must conform to a 
number of procedural requirements.27 Specifically, they must provide the 
corporation with pre-merger notice, hold the shares continuously through 
the effective date of the transaction, and not vote in favor of the proposed 
merger or consolidation.28 Failure to take any of these steps results in 
waiver of the right to an appraisal. 
i. The Process for Seeking an Appraisal  
The initial obligation with respect to appraisal rights falls on the 
corporation.29 The corporation must provide notice of appraisal rights at 
least twenty days before the shareholder meeting seeking approval of the 
transaction.30 Notice must include a copy of the statute and provide a 
detailed explanation of the process for perfecting appraisal rights.31 If the 
corporation does not fulfill these requirements, the court may nonetheless 
permit shareholders to seek a quasi-appraisal remedy.32  
Although not required by statute, directors have, as a matter of fidu-
ciary duty, an obligation to disclose to shareholders “the available mate-
rial facts that would enable them to make an informed decision, pre-
merger, whether to accept the merger consideration or demand apprais-
al.”33 Material facts are those in which there is a “substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding 
how to vote.”34 For example, companies may have an obligation to pro-
vide financial disclosure in the pre-merger notice.35 
  
 26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c) (2013). 
 27. See id. at § 262(a). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at § 262(d)(1). 
 30. See id. See also R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI AND JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, § 9.44 Procedural 
Aspects of the Delaware Appraisal Statute, in 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN’S DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (2014). 
 31. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (2013). 
 32. See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 30. Quasi appraisal actions arise where the 
statutory requirements for an appraisal action have not been met but dissenting shareholders are 
nonetheless allowed to petition a court for a determination of fair value. Robert B. Schumer, Quasi-
Appraisal: The Unexplored Frontier of Stockholder Litigation?, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Scott Hirst, ed., Feb. 21, 2012, 9:34 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/21/quasi-appraisal-the-unexplored-frontier-of-
stockholder-litigation/. The availability of a quasi-appraisal differs from case to case, but is generally 
recognized in cases where the corporation fails to make the requisite disclosures, and it has directly 
affected the shareholders’ decision of whether to seek an appraisal. Id. 
 33. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 30. 
 34. In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 17 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 35. See generally Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 859 A.2d 80 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that 
Motorola, Inc. did not satisfy its disclosure duty when it failed to provide any financial information). 
2015] AN APPRAISAL OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS IN DELAWARE 113 
Prior to the vote on the consolidation or merger, a dissenting share-
holder must submit a written demand,36 allowing the corporation to as-
sess the “appraisal risk” before proceeding with the transaction.37 The 
demand must “reasonably inform the corporation” of the shareholder’s 
identity and intent to seek an appraisal.38 Shareholders are entitled to 
notification of approval of the transaction39 and can withdraw their de-
mand anytime within sixty days of the effective date.40 Shareholders may 
also request a written statement setting out the number of shares subject 
to appraisal.41  
ii. Commencement of Appraisal Proceeding  
The corporation or dissenting shareholder may file a petition with 
the Court of Chancery requesting a determination of fair value of the 
shares within 120 days of the effective date of the transaction.42 The cor-
poration has twenty days to submit a consolidated list of the names of the 
shareholders demanding payment for their shares.43 The Chancery Court 
has the authority to determine the shareholders entitled to exercise ap-
praisal rights.44     
In determining fair value, the court takes into account “all relevant 
factors.” Relevant factors are those “known or ascertainable as of the 
merger date that illuminates the future prospects of the company.”45 They 
include “assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other 
elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s 
  
 36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (2013). 
 37. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 30. Specifically, the pre-merger notice informs the 
corporation of the number of dissenting shareholders and the number of shares demanding an ap-
praisal. Id. If too many shareholders dissent, acquirers may kill the deal. Commonly, public compa-
nies make it a closing condition that appraisal claims do not exceed 5-10 percent of the total number 
of shares. LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, supra note 4, at 3. 
 38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (2013). There is, however, no “specific” form the 
shareholder must use. Id.  
 39. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 30. Within ten days after approval of the transaction, 
the surviving corporation must inform each dissenting shareholder who submitted a written appraisal 
as of the merger’s effective date. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (2013). 
 40. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (2013). Thereafter, withdrawal requires written 
consent of the corporation. Id. 
 41. See id. at § 262(e). The shareholder must make the request within 120 days from the 
effective date of the merger. Id. See also BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 30. The corporation 
must mail the statement within ten days after the end of the delivery period for demands for apprais-
al, or within ten days of the shareholder’s request. Id. 
 42. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e) (2013). If filed by a dissenting shareholder, the 
shareholder must service a copy of the petition to the corporation. Id. 
 43. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(f) (2013). The Court of Chancery may hold a hearing 
and determine the number of shareholders who have complied with the statutory requirements and 
are therefore entitled to appraisal rights. See id. at § 262(g). Every dissenting shareholder bears the 
burden of proving fulfillment of the statutory prerequisites. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 30. 
 44. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2013). 
 45. In re Appraisal of the Orchard Enters., Inc., No. 5713–CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *5 (Del. 
Ch. July 18, 2012), aff’d, Orchard Enters., Inc. v. Merlin Partners LP, 2013 WL 1282001 (Del. Mar. 
28, 2013). 
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stock.”46 The court cannot, however, take into consideration any value 
resulting from the completion or expectation of the merger or consolida-
tion.47 
At trial, both parties must establish their proposed valuation by a 
preponderance of the evidence.48 The court can accept either valuation 
model, create its own, or use independent judgment to determine fair 
value.49 Payment to shareholders occurs only after judicial determination 
of fair value, a period that can take years.50 Shareholders, however, re-
ceive interest calculated from the effective date of the merger through the 
day of payment.51 The statute imposes an interest rate equal to 5% over 
the Federal Reserve discount rate.52  
C. Valuation Methodologies  
Fair value is “the value of the Company to the stockholder as a go-
ing concern, rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition.”53 The 
courts seek only to determine the value of “what has been taken from the 
shareholder.”54 The calculation looks to the value at “the point just be-
fore” the transaction55 and thus excludes the effect of the merger or con-
solidation.56 The approach also excludes discounts that arise from the 
sale of a minority position.57 
i. Methodologies  
Fair value depends upon the selected valuation method (or meth-
ods).58 Courts consider “all generally accepted techniques of valuation 
used in the financial community.”59 Three methods are most common: 
  
 46. In re Nine Sys. Corp. S’holders. Litig., No. 3940–VCN, 2014 WL 4383127, at *38 (Del. 
Ch. Sept. 4, 2014). 
 47. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2013). 
 48. See Appraisal of the Orchard Enters., 2012 WL 2923305, at *5. 
 49. See id. at *3. 
 50. See, e.g., Appraisal of the Orchard Enters., 2012 WL 2923305 (wherein the appraisal 
process took three years from the date of the company’s initial payment to shareholders). 
 51. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2013). 
 52. See id. Courts allow the rate unless there is good cause not to. Id. 
 53. M.P.M. Enters. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999). 
 54. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996). 
 55. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI AND JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN § 9.45 Valuation in a Delaware Ap-
praisal Proceeding, in 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN’S DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (2014). 
 56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2013). 
 57. See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989) (“The applica-
tion of a discount to a minority shareholder is contrary to the requirement that the company be 
viewed as a ‘going concern.’”). 
 58. Notably, the Model Business Corporation Act’s appraisal provision seeks to increase 
economical and satisfying solutions in appraisal actions by “motivating the parties to settle their 
differences in private negotiations without resort to judicial appraisal proceedings.” MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 13.01 cmt. 1 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 59. Cede & Co., 684 A.2d at 296 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 
1983)). 
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discounted cash flow analysis (DCF); comparable companies analysis; 
and the comparable transactions analysis.60   
The comparable companies and comparable transactions analyses 
are alike in that they both look to similarly situated enterprises.61 The 
former analysis compares the corporation to publicly traded companies 
using “price multiples of each corporation’s stock against selected 
benchmarks.”62 The latter analysis “requires finding similar transactions, 
quantifying those transactions through financial metrics, and applying 
those metrics to the company at issue in order to arrive at a value.”63 
Both methods raise concerns over reliability. Not enough data always 
exists to make adequate comparisons. Moreover, different stages of 
growth may make comparisons problematic.64 
The DCF method is “probably the most prominent and frequently 
used” method of appraisal.65 The model presumes that “the value of a 
company is equal to the present value of its projected future cash 
flows.”66 The method looks to cash flow projections over a specified 
period of time, typically five years, plus a terminal value, multiplied by a 
discount rate.67 The terminal value entails a calculation of the present 
value of all of the company’s future cash flows commencing after the 
specific projection period.68 
The applicable discount rate seeks to establish the present value of 
projected cash flows and terminal value.69 This step “has a profound ef-
  
 60. Appraisal and Alternative Valuation Methods, PRACTICAL LAW, 
http://us.practicallaw.com/2-568-9286 (last visited Dec. 11, 2014). Other methods include: the 
comparable company approach; the segmented valuation approach; the comparable acquisition 
approach; earnings value; market value; and asset value. See generally Harvard Law Review Associ-
ation, supra note 20. 
 61. Appraisal and Alternative Valuation Methods, PRACTICAL LAW, 
http://us.practicallaw.com/2-568-9286 (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). A “comparable company” is 
typically in the same industry with similar business risk, and preferably has a single line of business. 
CFA Glossary, CFA INSTITUTE, 8, 
http://www.cfainstitute.org/learning/tools/glossary/Pages/index.aspx?SelectedLetter=C (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2015). 
 62. Appraisal and Alternative Valuation Methods, PRACTICAL LAW, 
http://us.practicallaw.com/2-568-9286 (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). See also Merion Capital, L.P. v. 
3M Cogent, Inc., Civ.A. No. 6247–VCP, 2013 WL 3793896, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013). 
 S. ection 1.02 
63
 In re U.S. Cellular Operating Co., No. Civ.A 18696–NC, 2005 WL 43994, 
at *17 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2005).  
 64. Appraisal and Alternative Valuation Methods, PRACTICAL LAW, 
http://us.practicallaw.com/2-568-9286 (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). 
 65. Wertheimer, supra note 13, at 628. 
 66. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 55. 
 67. See generally U.S. Cellular Operating Co., 2005 WL 43994. The amount does not take 
into account the taxes paid on any earnings. See In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 
495 (Del. Ch. 1991) (“Therefore, in applying the discounted cash flow approach, I use cash flows 
that neither include a deduction for taxes nor a corresponding adjustment (i.e., an addition) for 
taxes.”). 
 68. See Jay W. Eisenhofer and John L. Reed, Valuation Litigation, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 
113 (1997). 
 69. See U.S. Cellular Operating Co., 2005 WL 43994, at *15. 
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fect on the share price in an appraisal action.”70 The discount rate is usu-
ally industry-specific and derived from the corporation’s weighted aver-
age cost of capital.71  
After computing the present value, the courts will add any non-
operating assets.72 Then, “the total of these figures is divided by the 
number of shares outstanding, and the resulting amount is the fair value 
per share of the company.”73 Since the DCF method seeks to denote the 
present value of the company’s cash flow, the result “fully reflects the 
value of the company as a going concern”74 As a result, adjustments to 
reflect a minority discount or the added value of the merger are unneces-
sary.  
ii. Subjectivity and Uncertainty 
Despite primary reliance on a single method of valuation, the “prob-
lems endemic to an appraisal proceeding . . . cannot be eliminated by the 
choice of [a particular] methodology.”75 Such problems stem from the 
fact that the appraisal value represents a mere estimation of the “fair val-
ue” of a company, which is “dependent on the assumptions underlying 
the calculations employed.”76  
The DCF analysis entails significant uncertainty. For example, to 
determine the prospective cash flows of an enterprise, courts look to 
“historical data, operating trends, and other relevant factors, but it is still 
nothing more than a prediction of future events.”77 Likewise, computing 
the applicable discount entails underlying assumptions that can lead to 
uncertainty.78 Calculation of terminal value has also been described as 
“exercises in guesswork and subjectivity.”79   
The inherent lack of objectivity has the practical result of transform-
ing appraisal proceedings into a ballet of experts.80 These experts, even 
while relying on the same methodology can reach starkly contrasting 
conclusions. For example, in Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp.,81 both 
  
 70. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 52 (quoting Crescent/Mach I P'ship, L.P. v. Turner, 
No. Civ.A. 17455–VCN, 2007 WL 1342263 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). 
 71. Id. The corporation’s cost of debt and its cost of equity are the two major components of 
the weighted average cost of capital. Id. They are generally averaged “based on the company’s 
actual capital structure on the date of the merger.” Id. 
 72. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 55. For example, excess working capital—the 
“amount of working capital beyond the amount an entity needs to fund its business”—is a non-
operating asset. In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig, 611 A.2d 485, 495–96 (Del. Ch. 1991). 
 73. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 55. 
 74. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75. Wertheimer, supra note 13, at 629. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Eisenhofer & Reed, supra note 68. 
 79. Wertheimer, supra note 13, at 630. 
 80. Id. at 629. 
 81. CIV. A. No. 8282, 1990 WL 109243 (Del. Ch., Aug. 1,1990). 
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parties’ experts used models based upon net assets and discounted future 
returns, yet obtained vastly differing results.82 The “widely divergent” 
views on assets and liability forced the court “to pick and choose among 
the competing contentions, in search of a reasonable, and fair, value.”83 
II.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF APPRAISAL ACTIONS SINCE 2010  
Shareholders invoking appraisal rights, therefore, face a number of 
risks. A dissenting shareholder “loses the traditional benefits of stock 
ownership,” such as the right to receive payment of dividends and other 
distributions on the shares.84 The change in status essentially places the 
shareholder’s investment “in limbo” until the resolution of the appraisal 
action.85 Moreover, Delaware defers any payment until the determination 
of fair value. As a result, the dissenting shareholders become subject to 
the company’s credit risk.86 Mostly, however, shareholders face uncer-
tainty with regard to the outcome. Because courts do not take the merger 
price into account, fair value can be less than the amount paid to other 
shareholders.87 
Finally, shareholders generally must absorb the expenses associated 
with the appraisal process,88 although not court costs.89  
Shareholders do uniquely benefit from one aspect of the statutory 
framework. Although not paid until after the determination of “fair val-
ue,” shareholders receive a statutory interest rate calculated from the date 
of closing until the award is actually paid.90 Statutory interest “serves to 
avoid an undeserved windfall to the respondent in an appraisal action, 
who would otherwise have had free use of money rightfully belonging to 
  
 82. See id. at *8–9. 
 83. Id. at *9. 
 84. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 30 (quoting Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Cede & 
Co., 657 A.2d 254, 258–59 (Del. 1995)). For the most part, this change in shareholder status occurs 
on the effective date of the merger. Id. 
 85. Gilliand v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 312 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 86. Id. Under the Model Business Corporation Act, in contrast, a dissenting shareholder must 
receive an amount in cash equal to the corporation’s estimate of fair value within 30 days. See 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.24 (2002). If the dissenting shareholders demand further payment and 
the court proceeds with an appraisal hearing, the shareholders will receive the remainder of the “fair 
value” at the end of the proceeding. Id. Unlike under the Delaware statute, this means that the only 
payment withheld from dissenting shareholders is the disputed amount. Id. 
 87. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 30. 
 88. Specifically, “[t]he costs of the proceeding may be determined by the Court and taxed 
upon the parties as the Court deems equitable in the circumstances.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j) 
(2013). The court can charge the expenses “pro rata against the value of all the shares entitled to an 
appraisal.” Id. 
 89. Absent bad faith, the court typically allocates court costs to the surviving corporation. 
Siegel, supra note 21, at 240. See also Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 77 (Del. 1950); 
Meade v. Pac. Gamble Robinson Co., 58 A.2d 415, 418 (Del. 1948). 
 90. See Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., Civ.A. No. 6247–VCP, 2013 WL 3793896, 
at *25 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2013). 
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the petitioners. . . . . the respondent derived a benefit from having the use 
of the petitioners’ funds at no cost.”91  
The court awards shareholders statutory interest on the appraisal 
award at a rate equal to the Federal discount rate, plus 5%.92 Absent good 
cause to find otherwise, the interest applies regardless of the court’s de-
termination with respect to fair value.93 As a result, some investors will 
profit even if the court awards an amount that is equal to, or only slightly 
above, the merger price. For example, in Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M 
Cogent, Inc.,94 the court appraised the shares at $0.37 higher than what 
was received in the merger, yet the statutory interest rate was over seven 
times greater than the federal discount rate.95 Declining to adhere to the 
respondent’s objections to the rate, the Court of Chancery noted, “[t]here 
are risks to both sides in an appraisal proceeding, however, and the ap-
plicable interest rate is only one of them.”96 In addition, because of the 
sizable interest rate, “the mere threat of the mounting interest cost can 
coerce companies into considering unfavorable settlements with stock-
holders bent on pursuing an appraisal action.”97 
A. Empirical Evidence 
Until recently, “the remedy [of appraisal rights] had been infre-
quently invoked, at least as measured by reported legal decisions.”98 Be-
tween 1972 and 1981, for example, there were only about 20 reported 
state court decisions.99 That, however, has changed, with appraisal ac-
tions becoming more common.100 
Given the subjectivity involved in valuing shares, the benefits to 
shareholders of asserting appraisal rights remain difficult to predict. The 
following section, however, seeks to reduce some of the uncertainty. The 
section analyzes the twelve reported appraisal actions in Delaware that 
occurred from 2010 through the present and compares the price obtained 
  
 91. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 92. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2013). The rate is compounded quarterly. Id. 
 93. Id. For example, the court may choose not to apply the rate if it finds that the shareholder 
pursued the appraisal in bad faith. 
 94. 2013 WL 3793896. 
 95. See id. at *n.205. See also infra Table: Appraisal Actions 2010–2014. 
 96. Merion Capital, L.P., 2013 WL 3793896, at *n.205. 
 97. Daniel E. Wolf et al.,, Appraisal Rights—The Next Frontier in Deal Litigation?, 
KIRKLAND M&A UPDATE, KIRKLAND & ELLIS, 2 (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/MAUpdate_050113.pdf.  
 98. Wertheimer, supra note 13, at 619–20. 
 99. Wertheimer, supra note 13, at 620 n.32 (citing Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal 
Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 829 n.3 (1984)). This was the case although there were over 
16,000 mergers within the United States. Id. 
 100. Wertheimer, supra note 13, at 620. In part, this may have resulted from a shift in the type 
of consideration used in the transactions, with consideration increasingly paid in cash. One report 
noted that in approximately 90% of relevant transactions over the past few years, acquirers have paid 
in cash. See Wolf et al., supra note 97, at 1. The type of consideration is important, since ordinarily 
mergers with public companies are exempt from appraisal rights, except when paid in cash. See 
supra Part I. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2013). 
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in the merger to the fair value determined by the court. Over this period, 
the Court of Chancery has generally appraised the value of the dissenting 
stockholder’s shares at a value significantly higher than what was re-
ceived as consideration for the merger or consolidation.101 As shown in 
the appendix, the court set the fair value anywhere from 3% to as much 
as 149% above the merger price. Moreover, the downside risk seems 
limited. In four of the cases, the court found that the price paid in the 
offering was fair.102  
Two cases set the value below the merger consideration.103 The 
unique circumstances of these cases, however, should be taken into ac-
count. In In re Trados Incorporated Shareholder Litigation,104 the com-
pany actually valued the common stock at zero and gave a monetary val-
ue only to its preferred stock.105 The $0.10 per share value was only 
found within some Board meeting minutes, and the court agreed with the 
company that the shares had no actual value.106  
Additionally, shareholders considering bringing an appraisal action 
should not be overly concerned with the court’s decreased fair value 
price in Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc.107 In Gearreald, the court deter-
mined the fair value of the company was approximately $5.75 million 
less than what was obtained as cash consideration in the merger.108 This 
“decreased” figure is deceiving, however, because it fails to show that $6 
million of the $40 million acquisition price was “held in escrow to pay 
claims against the Company arising during the two-year period following 
the close of the merger, including appraisal claims and costs.”109 If the 
amount held in escrow is taken into account in the company’s initial fair 
value determination, then it becomes clear that the court did not actually 
find a decreased value through the appraisal proceeding.110 
B. Shareholder-Friendly Valuations  
In the past five years, shareholders seem more likely to receive a fa-
vorable valuation from the Court of Chancery. This occurs most often 
when the court removes subjective factors from the fair market assess-
ment. For example, in In re Appraisal of the Orchard Enterprises, Inc., 
one of the court’s main concerns was determining the discount rate. The 
court noted, “[r]ather than . . . use methods that involve great subjectivity 
  
 101. See infra Table: Appraisal Actions 2010–2014. 
 102. See infra Table: Appraisal Actions 2010–2014. 
 103. See infra Table: Appraisal Actions 2010–2014. 
 104. 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 105. See id. at 69–70. 
 106. See id. at 70. 
 107. C.A. No. 5233–VCP, 2012 WL 1569818 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012). 
 108. See id. at *1. 
 109. Id. at *3. 
 110. See id. at *1, *3 ($40 million – $6 million held in escrow = $34 million fair value, and the 
court determined that $34,244,570 was the fair value of the company). 
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and lack firm grounding in corporate finance theory, . . . I choose to de-
termine the discount rate using only the CAPM method.”111 In doing so 
the court rejected both parties’ discount rate valuations, which relied on a 
number of methods, and opted for a more simplified approach.112 
This indicates that shareholders may have an easier time predicting 
whether benefits will result from appraisal actions, to the extent that the 
methodology becomes more standardized. Should courts coalesce in ad-
hering to valuation methods with less underlying assumptions imbedded 
within them, shareholders will face less uncertainty in seeking an ap-
praisal remedy.  
Like Orchard Enterprises, the court in Laidler v. Hesco Bastion 
Environmental, Inc. found an increased fair value of the shareholders’ 
shares through the appraisal proceeding.113 In Laidler, the increased val-
uation turned on the unwillingness of the Chancery Court to exclude 
entirely non-recurring revenue.114 
The company’s expert provided a valuation that sought to back “out 
certain revenues” that former management indicated were non-recurring, 
such as those generated from the BP oil spill.115 Rather than make esti-
mates based on unpredictable “non-recurring” or “recurring” environ-
mental disasters in determining future cash flows, the Court instead aver-
aged past cash flows from the prior three years.116  
These cases suggest that appraisal rights are worth the risk when 
there is a clear non-subjective basis for arguing for a higher value. When 
shareholders can readily designate the subjective factors imbedded in the 
appraisal, they are more likely to obtain a greater price per share than 
what was received in the merger.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
The court’s determination of fair value is subjective in nature. 
Nonetheless, certain elements of the valuation process have become 
more predictable. For the most part, the courts use the cash value with 
the least amount of speculation involved. Moreover, the courts have ap-
peared unsympathetic to efforts to reduce value through the complete 
exclusion of non-recurring revenue.  
  
 111. Appraisal of the Orchard Enters., 2012 WL 2923305, at *3 (“CAPM” standing for capital 
asset pricing model). 
 112. See id. at *1, *3. The court chose to use one method, rather than “shroud [its] determina-
tion of fair value in the false precision of averaging the results of three different methods of calculat-
ing cost of capital in coming to a single discount rate…” Id. at *3. 
 113. See infra Table: Appraisal Actions 2010–2014. 
 114. Laidler v. Hesco Bastion Envtl., Inc., Civ.A. No. 7561–VCG, 2014 WL 1877536 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 28, 2014). 
 115. Id. at *5. 
 116. Id. at *11. 
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To the extent that the factors used in determining valuation become 
more objective, shareholders can better predict the likelihood of a higher 
valuation. The results over the past five years suggest that shareholders 
have succeeded in doing so. In the reported cases, the Court of Chancery 
rarely places a fair value at less than the price obtained in the offering. 
Finally, greater objectivity benefits all shareholders. Where companies 
can predict the outcome of a valuation process, they will know that a 
price below that amount will encourage the exercise of appraisal rights. 
As scholars have noted, the “mere threat of invoking appraisal rights can 
lead an acquirer to increase the offer consideration.”117  
 
  
 117. Joseph Glatt, Is it Worth it? The Value of Delaware Appraisal Rights to the Activist Inves-
tor, ACTIVIST INVESTING DEVELOPMENTS, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, LLP, 1 (2007), 
http://www.srz.com/files/News/ebd7562a-5d91-41ec-84c2-
4b2b280f80dc/Presentation/NewsAttachment/fcf3914f-2885-4af4-b24a-
23804876290f/filesfilesActivist_summer07_1_Is_it_worth_it.Glatt.pdf. At the time of publication of 
this Article, the Corporation Law Council has proposed certain amendments to the Delaware General 
Corporation Law referenced herein, particularly relating to fee-shifting bylaws. See 2015 DE S.R. 
12. The proposed legislation arose from the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in ATP Tour Inc. v. 
Deutscher Tennis Bund, et al., 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). See Memorandum of Explanation of Coun-
cil Legislative Proposal, available at 
http://www.andrewskurth.com/assets/htmldocuments/15137_Proposed_DGCL_Amendments_Rel_D
ocs_2.pdf.  
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APPENDIX 
The table below expresses the price paid in offering, the price ob-
tained through appraisal, and the difference between the two. It also pro-
vides active links to each of the cases.  













































































































+ $0.95 19.8% 



































































































 118. This denotes fair value of the company as a whole. The court did not compute fair value 
per share (there were 533,792 Series A preferred and 1,479,551 common shares). Gearreald, 2012 
WL 1569818, at *1. 
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